

**SECRET**

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8 NOV 1965

FMSAC No. 345

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Director of Central Intelligence  
**SUBJECT:** Conclusions of Space Intelligence Panel

1. This memorandum is for information only; particular reference is made to the attachment.
2. Attached is the preliminary text of the conclusions reached by the Space Intelligence Panel with regard to the existence of a Soviet manned lunar landing program competitive with Apollo.
3. The attached conclusions have been shown to [redacted] He found them to accurately express his personal belief and to carefully express the conclusions reached by the whole Panel.
4. Copies will be sent to the other members for their consideration and arrangements made to coordinate any suggested changes.

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[redacted]  
**CARL E. DUCKETT**  
 Director,  
 Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center

CONCURRENCE:

[redacted]  
 Deputy Director for Science and Technology

10 NOV 1965

Date

Attachment:  
 Conclusions  
 reached by  
 SIP

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
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**SECRET****ATTACHMENT**Conclusions Reached by Space Intelligence Panel

It is clear that the Soviet space program is big, generally competitive, and versatile. Its major objective is to enhance the technological and military image of the USSR relative to that of the United States by means of major accomplishments in space. It is not now possible to determine with certainty the specific direction the Soviets will take in attempting to meet this major objective. In large measure, this results from the high degree of flexibility afforded Soviet planners by the range of propulsion systems under development in the USSR. Those actions visible to us to date are not inconsistent with a manned lunar landing program competitive with Apollo. Neither are they inconsistent with a major manned space station program nor with other projects such as an early manned circumlunar flight aimed at reducing the world impact of a successful Apollo landing. Since this focus of the program is not as yet evident, the possibility that it may be competitive manned lunar landing cannot be ruled out. If this is in fact the case, we are quite certain they are not ahead of the United States in this program but are rather from 0 to 18 months behind.

In considering this problem, a need was immediately felt for improved data on Soviet static testing of large engines and stages in terms of both the characteristics of the facilities available and the history of their use.

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